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Abstract
Previous studies have posited that elites are willing to advance the redistribution
of income and social goods when the negative effects of inequality, such as crime
and conflict, threaten their own interests. Although elites acknowledge these
negative effects, their support for redistributive policies remains low throughout
the Global South. We address this paradox using a multi-method research design.
Drawing on 56 in-depth interviews with Brazilian political and economic elites,
we document how, when discussing the negative effects of inequality, interviewees
consistently characterized the poor as ignorant, irrational and politically
incompetent. We use these findings to theorize about the negative impact of such
perceptions of the poor on elite support for redistribution. We then test this
relationship using survey data gathered from random samples of political and
economic elites in Brazil, South Africa and Uruguay (N¼544). We find the relation-
ship to be robust.
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1. Introduction
Scholars of inequality have good reason to care about elites’ preferences. Elites have the abil-
ity to shape the politics of redistribution, owing to the power positions that they occupy
(Reis and Moore, 2005; Higley and Burton, 2006; Blofield, 2011a; Khan, 2012; Yamokoski
and Dubrow, 2008; Lo´pez, 2013a,b; Hoffmann-Lange, 2018). Existing scholarship suggests
that elites will support more redistribution when they are affected by the negative conse-
quences of inequality. For instance, numerous studies document the connection between in-
equality and criminal violence (Fajnzylber et al., 2002; Bourguignon et al., 2003; Choe,
2008), the latter of which can directly affect elites’ own safety. Further, inequality poses
threats to elites in the form of uprisings and political violence (Boix, 2003; Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2005). Consequently, given the right incentives, support for redistribution can be
in the interest of elites (de Swaan, 1988; Rueda and Stegmueller, 2016).
In the Global South, however, although elites acknowledge the negative consequences
of inequality for themselves, they generally have low levels of commitment to redistribution
initiatives (de Swaan et al., 2000; Clarke and Sison, 2003; Hossain, 2005; Reis and
Moore, 2005). This is true even in contexts of relatively high state capacity, where elites ac-
knowledge that tools for combating inequality either exist or could be developed (Reis
and Moore, 2005). This holds even for political elites who, in theory, should be responsive
to the redistributive aspirations of their constituencies. What explains elites’ weak support
for redistributive policies in contexts where they identify inequality as threatening to
themselves?
We address this question by focusing primarily on Brazil, a country marked by high in-
equality and in which the externalities of inequality are extreme, particularly in the form of
urban violence. Studies have shown that Brazilian elites recognize inequality as one of the
most urgent national problems and identify urban violence as one of its most salient conse-
quences (Reis, 2000; Reis and Moore, 2005; Lo´pez, 2013b, 2014, 2016). Yet redistributive
policies are still far from consensual (Paugam et al., 2017). We begin with an analysis of
data collected from in-depth interviews with Brazilian politicians, civil servants and business
leaders (N¼ 56). We find that participants consistently characterized the poor as ignorant,
irrational and politically incompetent when explaining their own limited support for redis-
tributive social policies. We use this finding to theorize about the relationship between per-
ceptions of the poor and elite attitudes toward redistribution. We hypothesize that elite
support for redistributive policies will be affected by their evaluation of the poor, even when
they identify negative externalities of inequality, such as criminal violence. To test this rela-
tionship, we analyze data that we collected from a random sample of Brazilian political, civil
servant and business elites (N¼180). We find the relationship to be robust.
To examine the external validity of our findings, we replicate our models in two other
cases of middle-income countries with relatively high state capacity: South Africa (N¼ 184)
and Uruguay (N¼ 180). In the comparative literature, South Africa is often presented as
very similar to Brazil in terms of its high levels of inequality and the negative effects these
have generated (Marx, 1998; Lieberman, 2003; Moraes Silva, 2012). We thus expect to see
similar patterns in Brazil and South Africa. That said, if the underlying mechanism we iden-
tify holds, we should expect to observe it in less extreme cases too. To test this assumption,
we replicate our models in the Uruguayan data. Like Brazil and South Africa, Uruguay is a
middle-income developing democracy with relatively high state capacity where elites face
2 M. Lo´pez et al.
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externalities of inequality. However, it is historically more egalitarian, democratic and so-
cially cohesive than the other two cases and much less unequal. Our findings show that,
across all three cases, negative perceptions of the poor result in lowered support for redis-
tributive policies, although the baseline prevalence of such perceptions varies by country
and elite sector.
By highlighting the impact of perceptions of the poor on elite attitudes toward redistributive
policies, we identify cultural processes as the missing link between economic incentives—cre-
ated by the negative effects of inequality—and subsequent policy outcomes. The idea of culture
as a mediator has been promoted by both political economists (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009)
and cultural sociologists (Lamont et al., 2014) but rarely mobilized to account for the actions
of elites. A number of studies have examined the relationship between perceptions of inequality
and attitudes toward redistribution, among both the general population (Oorschot and
Halman, 2000; Oorschot, 2006; McCall and Kenworthy, 2009; Niemela¨, 2011; Cavaille´ and
Trump, 2015) and elites (de Swaan et al., 2000; Hossain, 2005; Reis and Moore, 2005). Yet,
to the best of our knowledge, none has estimated the effect of both perceptions of external
incentives and perceptions of the poor on the willingness of elites to support redistributive so-
cial policies. Bridging political economy and cultural sociology, our study highlights how cul-
tural processes mediate the relationship between material incentives and policy outputs. With
its multi-method research design, this article is also an answer to Cousin et al.’s (2018) recent
call for greater methodological diversity in elite research.
In what follows, we first review the literature on elite attitudes toward redistribution and
present our theoretical contribution in light of alternative theories. Moving to our data and
methods, we describe our criteria for case-selection and sampling as well as our identification
and analysis strategies. We then present our findings in two parts. First, we draw on in-depth in-
terview data to build our argument. Second, we test this argument using the survey data. We
conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for the study of elites and redistribution.
2. Explaining elite attitudes toward redistribution
Under what conditions will elites support redistributive policies? The bulk of the political
economy literature on elites and redistribution tends to assume that, because elites benefit
from inequality, they will always try to prevent redistribution. Resource concentration is,
after all, a defining characteristic of the elite, who are often responsible for generating
inequalities through tax-evasion, labor-market and state-capture practices.
Most scholars highlight that elites will only grudgingly agree to redistribution when
threatened ‘from below.’ Elite-driven political processes that signal redistribution—such as
democratization—are seen to produce limited, and ultimately undesirable, concessions
(Boix, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005). Studies in this tradition argue that, because
elites never actually intend to redistribute but only to signal redistribution in order to pacify
the poor, redistributive agendas are often limited, provisory and configured to fail. For
instance, Soifer (2013) contends that elites’ support for democratization depends on their
anticipation of the state’s failure to effect redistribution. Other studies argue that elites pur-
posefully promote inefficiency by fostering oversized bureaucracies or by embedding institu-
tional roadblocks to redistribution in the constitution (Acemoglu et al., 2011; Albertus and
Menaldo, 2014, 2018).
Economic and cultural determinants of elite attitudes 3
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Other scholars argue that threats from below have little influence on the decision-making
processes of elites and that apparent concessions to the poor occur for reasons completely
unrelated to redistributive demands. These include tension between urban economic elites
and landed elites (Ansell and Samuels, 2014), constraints posed by international actors
(Haggard and Kaufman, 2016), and splits within ruling coalitions (O’Donnell et al., 2013;
Haggard and Kaufman, 2016). These approaches view rampant inequality as desirable by—
or at least inconsequential to—elites. Redistribution, when it happens, is understood as an
unintentional consequence of internal disputes among elites.
Largely ignored in this literature is a growing body of empirical work that documents
how elites systematically identify poverty and inequality as a problem not only for the poor
but also for themselves. Crime and violence, for example, are understood by elites to be un-
desirable side effects of inequality that negatively impact their own lives (e.g. Reis and
Moore, 2005; Rueda and Stegmueller, 2016). Moreover, research has shown that elites view
inequality as a threat to democracy and economic stability and as fuel for political practices
that they find undesirable, such as clientelism (Lo´pez, 2014). This is particularly striking in
unequal, recently democratized, middle-income countries (e.g. Reis and Moore, 2005), such
as the ones we analyze in this article.
One way of reconciling elite views of negative externalities with their lack of support for
redistributive efforts is by suggesting that elites do not reject redistribution but simply do
not want to pay for it. In this case, elites are not avoiding redistributive social policies per se
but rather taxes. Previous studies show, however, that elites have been successful at raising
state revenue without paying for it, often relocating fiscal costs to the middle class (Fairfield,
2010; Hacker and Pierson, 2010; Winters, 2011; Bogliaccini and Luna, 2016). If elites iden-
tify the negative externalities of poverty and have the capacity to put forward effective social
policies without necessarily bearing the fiscal costs themselves, then what prevents them
from effectively coordinating around redistribution?
Studies in political culture provide an answer by highlighting the role of values, norms
and political ideology in determining elite attitudes toward redistribution (e.g. Putnam,
1971; Verba and Orren, 1985; Verba et al., 1987; Pye and Verba, 2015). For instance, in
their pioneering cross-national comparison of elite attitudes toward inequalities, Verba et al.
(1987) argued that while elites in the USA value political equality and equality of opportuni-
ties, elites in Sweden focus much more on equality of outcomes; and this might explain their
stronger support for welfare policies. Even if the authors’ conceptualization of political cul-
ture as national values is today criticized as essentializing (Somers and Skocpol, 1995), these
studies sensitize us to the importance of cultural understandings and interpretations in shap-
ing responses to inequality.
Other studies of culture have identified how normative evaluations of the poor—who are
seen as either deserving or undeserving—and of social policies—which are seen as either fair
or unfair—shape attitudes toward redistributive policies (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005;
Katz, 2013). Nevertheless, the lack of redistribution in many countries in the Global South
does not seem to operate through perceptions of deservingness or fairness. In Latin America
(Lo´pez, 2016), Africa (Kalati and Manor, 2005; Kalebe-Nyamongo, 2012) and South Asia
(Clarke and Sison, 2003), elites generally perceive inequality to be unfair, are aware of its
structural causes and view the poor as deserving of relief. There too, however, elites do not
fully embrace redistributive social policies.
4 M. Lo´pez et al.
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Focusing on the Global South, Reis and Moore’s (2005) influential study suggests that it
is elites’ sense of responsibility that accounts for redistributive outcomes. They argue that
incentives to redistribute are often present in the Global South but elites relinquish responsi-
bility to the state, do not engage personally in redistributive efforts, and consequently com-
promise the redistribution that they proclaim to support. Other studies have shown that
elites are unlikely to cooperate when they do not think that others will share the costs of re-
distribution (Feierherd et al., 2017) or when they question the reliability of the institutions
charged with the task of overseeing redistribution (Berens and Von Schiller, 2017). Taken
together, these studies suggest that the actions of elites are largely determined by their per-
ceptions of what others might do.
Our study bridges the economic incentives approach and the cultural processes approach
by documenting how the effects of negative externalities on elite support for redistribution
are curtailed by their views of the poor. Substantively, we contribute to explanations for
why, decades after democratization, so many middle-income countries have remained highly
unequal and have witnessed only limited redistribution. Theoretically, our contribution lies
in highlighting the cultural mechanisms that mediate the relationship between material (or
economic) incentives and policy outputs.
Our analysis of in-depth interviews with Brazilian elites confirms that elites are indeed re-
sponsive to the negative effects of inequality and believe that redistribution would be in their
interests. Nevertheless, even if they see the poor as deserving of help, they perceive them as ig-
norant, irrational and incapable of making informed economic and political decisions. As a re-
sult, they are skeptical about the poor’s ability to lift themselves out of poverty—even with
governmental assistance. Views of the poor as ignorant and irrational also make elites suspi-
cious of each other, as they believe that incumbent political elites are capable of easily manipu-
lating the poor for personal gains and will do so before committing to elites’ collective interest.
Our analysis of survey data supports this argument about the importance of perceptions of the
poor. As hypothesized, we find that perceptions of the poor as irrational substantially reduce
elite support for redistributive policies, regardless of their views about negative externalities.
In pointing to the role of elite perceptions of the poor, we do not mean to imply that
prior studies got things wrong. We acknowledge that there are other important structural
and attitudinal variables that impact upon elite attitudes toward redistribution. As docu-
mented above, other studies have identified tax avoidance, political culture (e.g. egalitarian
vs. liberal ideologies) and perceptions of personal or group responsibility as crucial determi-
nants of elite attitudes. We view these explanations as complementary to our own and in-
cluded covariates that account for them in our regression models. Our findings are also
reconcilable with the large body of literature on political economy that points to the role of
distrust in explaining negative attitudes toward social policies (Axelrod, 1984; Tabellini,
2008; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; Berens and Von Schiller, 2017). In our account, percep-
tions of the poor as irrational lead elites to be suspicious and distrustful of the actions of
others, thus hindering coordination around redistribution.
3. Methods
Our study draws on two different types of data—in-depth interview and survey data—from
three cases—Brazil, South Africa and Uruguay. Below, we introduce our cases and then de-
tail our data collection and analysis procedures.
Economic and cultural determinants of elite attitudes 5
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3.1 Cases
The bulk of our study focuses on Brazil—a country with high levels of inequality and concomi-
tant strong negative consequences, such as crime and political instability. We build on the
Brazilian case because it provides a scenario in which we would expect to observe more consis-
tent support for redistributive policies among elites, given the persistent effects of negative ex-
ternalities in recent decades. We then test the findings that emerge from the Brazilian case in
two other developing democracies: South Africa and Uruguay. We view the South African case
as most closely resembling Brazil in terms of their historical patterns of inequality and the
Uruguayan case as most distinctive from Brazil in this respect. The inclusion of these two cases
follows the logic of replication outlined by Yin (2003, p. 47). In the multiple case study design
which he outlines, this logic is ‘analogous to that used in multiple experiments’.1 By testing
findings emerging from the Brazilian case in the South African and Uruguayan ones, we focus
on two cases that represent opposite ends of inequality profiles in the developing world and
thus adhere to the type of ‘two-tail design’ described by Yin. Following the same inferential
logic, the additional cases can also be considered as shadow cases, in the sense that they are not
analyzed in-depth but rather used for external validation (see Gerring and Cojocaru, 2016).
Brazil democratized in the late 1980s, opening to competitive politics in the context of
extreme fiscal chaos in government, criminal violence in urban areas, land invasions in rural
areas and the constant threat of military coup (Hagopian, 2007). Redistribution was per-
ceived to be in elites’ interest, because it would help mitigate dramatic externalities (Reis,
2000). Indeed, Brazilian politics was dominated by an agenda of greater equality and social
justice (Weyland, 1996). In the early 2000s, the left-wing Workers’ Party (PT) came into
power and, with the assistance of favorable economic times, promoted far-reaching policies
of social inclusion and redistribution (Blofield, 2011b; Campello and Zucco, 2016). At first,
the business community and other elite sectors endorsed PT’s redistributive agenda and
Brazil experienced a decline in income inequality. The expansion of cash transfers and a real
increase in the minimum wage played a significant role in this decline (Barros et al., 2010;
Azevedo et al., 2013; Ferreira et al., 2014; Lustig et al., 2016), which was facilitated by a
scenario of economic growth and high commodity prices (Carvalho, 2018). When economic
recession brought the need for a more substantial redistributive agenda, support from elites
faded, and in recent years inequality has been on the rise (Lavinas, 2017). Decades after de-
mocratization, the country remains one of the most unequal in the globe and both poverty
and its externalities remain unsolved. At the time we conducted our survey, Brazil had a
Gini coefficient of 0.56,2 reflecting the sharp contrast between a small elite of mostly white
Brazilians and a vast majority of mostly black and brown poor (Telles, 2004; Lamont et al.,
2016). Brazil thus represents a case of a middle-income country where elites were successful
at settling a transition to democracy and where they operate in a context of a fairly capable
state bureaucracy; but also one in which strong social boundaries exist between elites and
the poor (Moraes Silva and Lo´pez, 2015; Moraes Silva, 2016).
1 Yin goes on to say that ‘upon uncovering a significant finding from a single experiment, the immedi-
ate research goal would be to replicate this finding by conducting a second, third, and even more
experiments. . .only with such replication would the original finding be considered robust’. The same
logic of inference applies to multiple-case study designs
2 The Gini coefficient ranges from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). All measures of the Gini
coefficient mentioned in this paper can be found at https://data.worldbank.org
6 M. Lo´pez et al.
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South Africa is often positioned as comparable to Brazil in terms of its high levels of so-
cioeconomic inequality, authoritarian history and race relations (Marx, 1998; Lieberman,
2003; Moraes Silva, 2012). As in the Brazilian case, the South African transition to democ-
racy brought with it a left-leaning government campaigning on a redistributive agenda. Even
though the African National Congress (ANC) administration has implemented a variety of
social policies aimed at redressing historical inequities, overall inequality remained very
high, reaching 0.57, as measured by the Gini coefficient, at the time we collected our data.
The nature and scope of redistributive policies remain a key point of contention among
South African elites (Seekings and Nattrass, 2015). As in Brazil, South Africans often frame
inequality and poverty as the main contributors to social problems that affect the middle
class and elites (Teeger, 2014); and also like in the Brazilian case, poverty in South Africa is
strongly racialized (Seekings and Nattrass, 2008). Given these similarities, we view South
Africa as another case of middle-income country with relatively high state capacity and
strong social boundaries between elites and the poor. We expect patterns of elite perceptions
there to be similar to those found in Brazil.
In contrast, Uruguay is often presented as the Latin American country most dissimilar to
Brazil (Moreira, 2000; Lo´pez, 2013b). Building on a more solid history of partisan politics
and democratic rule, the country evidences moderate levels of inequality (Gini of 0.4 at the
time of our survey) and is among the safest in the developing world [PNUD (Programa de
las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo), 2013]. Coordination around redistribution has
generally been perceived as effective, particularly in the last administrations of the left-wing
coalition Frente Amplio (Blofield, 2011b). Racial inequalities play a minor role in
Uruguayan politics, and Uruguayans tend to see themselves as a homogeneous people
(Ravecca, 2010), even if there has been growing mobilization for the visibility of Afro-
Uruguayans (Andrews, 2010). Nevertheless, in the past decades, Uruguayan elites have also
dealt with increasing crime rates and other social problems that arose along with income dis-
parities post-democratization (Lo´pez, 2013b). The Uruguayan case allows us to address
whether the relationship between perceptions of the poor and attitudes toward redistribu-
tion holds even in contexts where socioeconomic inequalities have been historically lower,
elites seem to be more collectively engaged in redistribution, and social boundaries between
elites and the poor are expected to be less relevant.
3.2 Interviews
We analyzed 56 in-depth interviews with Brazilian state and market elites. Of those, 42 were
conducted in 1998 and 1999 by Reis and colleagues and have been made available to us for
analysis (see Reis, 2000, 2005). We supplement this dataset with an additional 14 inter-
views, which we conducted between 2011 and 2013.
The interviews took place with business, political and civil service elites in the cities of
S~ao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Fortaleza and Salvador. For business elites, participants were
CEOs, CFOs, Chairpersons of Boards and leaders in organizations of business representa-
tion (e.g. chambers of commerce and industry federations). For political elites, participants
were members of Congress from the four largest parties in the country, as well as local
legislators and a few members of the state executive branches of Rio de Janeiro, S~ao
Paulo, Ceara´ and Bahia. Civil servants were selected from among those occupying top-tier
positions in the federal government or state and municipal secretariats in Rio de Janeiro,
S~ao Paulo, Ceara´/Fortaleza and Bahia/Salvador. Interviews were semi-structured and
Economic and cultural determinants of elite attitudes 7
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designed around issues of social and economic policy. They lasted 50-minutes on average
and were recorded, transcribed, inductively coded and then re-coded according to the
coding schema described in Table 1.
In neither time period were participants primed to evaluate the poor. The finding regard-
ing their perceptions of the poor as ignorant and uninformed emerged inductively when we
analyzed the two sets of interviews together. Table 1 presents the frequencies of codes in the
two time periods. Although we can see differences in the prevalence of these codes across
time, the overall trend remains constant. In both time periods, elites viewed inequality as the
source of externalities, redistribution as a desirable outcome and the poor as deserving but
ignorant in contrast to maximizing elites. Indeed, these perceptions seem to have solidified
and become even more salient by 2013.
3.3 Surveys
Between 2013 and 2015, we fielded 544 questionnaires3 in random samples of elites in the
same sectors in Brazil, South Africa and Uruguay, with 60 respondents per sector in each
country.4 Following a strategy that draws on Hoffmann-Lange’s (2018) positional method,
elites were sampled based on their institutional positions. We focused on business leaders,
elected officials at the national level and top-tier civil servants. We chose these elites because
of their decision-making power and ability to shape public policy. Elected officials have an
obvious influence on policy, once it is in their hands to put forward legislation. Externalities
are a double concern for them, because they can also face electoral costs if they upset poor
voters. Civil servants hold significant power over policy design and agenda-setting, particu-
larly in Latin America (Dargent, 2015). The influence of economic elites on policymaking
and agenda-setting processes is well documented (Gilens and Page, 2014).
For the Brazilian survey, we stratified our sample into three groups or sectors: (a) elected
officials at the federal level from each of Brazil’s four main political parties (PMDB, PT,
Table 1. Prevalence of codes in percentages by period
1999 2012–2013
Externality: violence 62 93
Externality: other 62 85.7
The poor as capable 5 7
The poor as good/honest/want to make it 21.4 28.6
The poor as victims/passive/manipulated 66.7 57.1
The poor as irrational/ignorant 64.3 85.7
Elites as rational/more rational than the poor 54.8 57.1
Redistribution is necessary 81 100
N 42 14
3 The questionnaire can be found in the Supplementary Material.
4 In South Africa, we had 63 politicians and 61 businesspeople because the contracted survey com-
pany conducted interviews beyond the agreed-upon quota. Since all of the interviewees were se-
lected randomly, we decided to maintain the extra four cases in the dataset.
8 M. Lo´pez et al.
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PSDB and PSD),5 (b) top-tier civil servants within the federal government and (c) business leaders
(CEOs, CFOs or Chairpersons of the Boards of the country’s top 300 private firms). Civil serv-
ants were sampled from those holding DAS 5 and 6 positions—the highest status for civil serv-
ants in the country—in ministe´rios related to economics, development and social policy in the
federal government. The list of the top 300 companies was drawn from a business publication,
Revista Exame, which is a Forbes-type publication widely used in the corporate world in Brazil.
In South Africa, we sampled elected officials from the two largest parties in the National
Assembly: the ruling ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA), the official opposition party.
We sampled in proportion to each party’s representation in the National Assembly, so
two-thirds of respondents were from the ANC and one-third from the DA. In constructing
our sample of civil servants, we strategically chose 20 government departments charged
with a range of fiscal and social policy mandates and selected randomly from top-tier roles
(Director Generals, Deputy Director Generals, Chief Operating Officers and Chief
Directors). To construct our sample of business leaders, we triangulated a list of the top 300
companies (by market capitalization) from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange with The
Africa Report’s6 list of top 500 companies, which had been identified as a widely used list
by a senior contact at the Competitions Commission. We randomly sampled from this list
respondents holding the following positions: CEO, CFO or Chairperson of the Board.
In Uruguay, elected officials were sampled from the country’s three main parties, the rul-
ing Frente Amplio and the opposing Partido Colorado and Partido Nacional. Civil servants
were sampled from those holding the position of Director in any of the ministerios of the
national government. Business leaders were sampled from a list of the 250 largest private
companies, based on tax revenues and number of employees as reported in the national busi-
ness census. Respondents were CEOs, CFOs or Chairpersons of the Board.
The surveys were administered through face-to-face interviews, except for a handful in
South Africa that were conducted over the phone. We did not allow potential respondents
to nominate others to participate in their place.7 Generating probabilistic samples of elites is
challenging due to a high expectation of non-response in an already small population. Our
strategy for dealing with refusals to participate was to randomize substitutions and continue
to re-sample using the same sampling criteria until we reached a quota of 60 respondents
per group. This means that all elites in the sample frame had a known and different-from-
zero probability of being selected, but that probability was not necessarily the same, given
that new rounds of randomization increased the odds of selection. Still, those greater
odds were distributed randomly and should not correlate with any meaningful attribute.
The overall response rate was 32.3% for Brazil, 41% for South Africa and 54.4% for
Uruguay. Response rates per group can be found in Table 2.
The probabilistic sampling strategy, face-to-face instrument and relatively high response
rates make these datasets unique in the field of studies of elites. To the best of our knowl-
edge, ours is the first elite survey following such standards.
In order to estimate the effects of elites’ perceptions of the poor on their support for
redistributive social policies, we ran OLS regressions. Below, we provide further information
on our variables and model specification.
5 By ‘main parties’ we refer to those with the largest number of seats in parliament in 2013.
6 See https://www.theafricareport.com.
7 Except in one South African case, in which we allowed the CEO of Strategic Projects to participate.
Economic and cultural determinants of elite attitudes 9
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Outcome variable
For the outcome variable, we built an index of support for redistributive policies that is a
normalized interaction between respondents’ assessments of policies. We asked respondents
to evaluate a variety of social policies by telling us whether they thought each was (a) desir-
able and (b) viable. The policies were: universal healthcare, prioritizing the poor in higher
education, free higher education, quotas in higher education, free primary schooling, unem-
ployment insurance, food programs, housing programs, lowering income disparities be-
tween occupations and a universal basic-income program. These policies are specific enough
to give a sense of what kind of redistributive effects they might advance but general enough
that they could not be directly related to the policy positions advanced by recognizable polit-
ical groups, thus avoiding a response bias caused by partisan preferences.
Our index ranges from 0 (no policy is viable regardless of how many are desirable) to 1
(all policies are desirable and viable). In our measure, high scores imply that respondents not
only viewed a high number of policies as desirable, but also that they believed that such poli-
cies were possible to implement. By the same token, the index punishes ‘dreamers’—
respondents who expressed high support for policies but did not believe that they were feasi-
ble and thus would not commit time or resources toward implementing them. The distribu-
tion of the index by country and elite group can be seen in Figure 1.
Explanatory variable
The main independent variable, which seeks to capture elite views of poor, is a binary mea-
sure representing the respondent’s description of the average citizen as either (0) wise or (1)
uninformed and irrational.8 The description was in response to the following question:
In your opinion, the majority of Brazilian/South African/Uruguayan voters: vote wisely OR are
uninformed and irrational?
Note that this question does not mention the poor directly but rather asks about the aver-
age voter. In these middle-income and unequal countries, the median voter is understood to
be poor. This was confirmed in the interviews, in which participants used these terms inter-
changeably. The focus on average voters honed in on politics, rather than capturing percep-
tions of ignorance or irrational behavior from other dimensions of everyday life, such as
cultural taste or religious beliefs.9 As will be shown in the results from interviews, elites’
Table 2. Response rate per sector
Elected officials, n (%) Civil servants, n (%) Business, n (%)
Brazil 60 (30) 60 (51) 60 (25)
South Africa 63 (65) 60 (35) 61 (32)
Uruguay 60 (86) 60 (67) 60 (30)
8 Descriptives for each elite sector in each case can be found in the Supplementary Material.
9 We also ran alternative specifications with each component of the output variable and with an ordi-
nal measure for the perceived ignorance of the poor and. The ordinal measure indicates on a 5-point
scale participants’ agreement with the statement: People do not know how to vote properly. Results
support those found using the binary measure and are available in the Supplementary Material.
10 M. Lo´pez et al.
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support for redistributive policies is informed specifically by their perception of the poor’s
political behavior.
Covariates
We included three types of control variables in our model: (a) perceptions of externalities,
(b) biographical, ideological and socioeconomic characteristics of respondents that could af-
fect their predisposition to endorse social policies and (c) variables that reflect alternative ex-
planatory frameworks identified in the literature. We outline each of these measures below.
Elite sectors: The source of elite power is itself an important factor determining the incentives
to redistribute (Lo´pez, 2013a). We expected political and civil service elites to be more favorable
to redistributive policies than business elites. We account for this by controlling for elite sector
(political, economic and civil service), with civil service elites as the reference category.
Perceptions of externalities: Here we measure whether elites view poverty as a source of
negative externalities for themselves. Respondents were asked to name the main conse-
quence of poverty in an open-ended question and then choose two other consequences from
a list of 10 possible consequences.10 We coded perceptions of externalities as present if
respondents named a consequence that could affect their own safety (e.g. violence, social
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Figure 1. Distribution of policy support.
Notes: The horizontal line inside each box indicates the median. The boxes, upper line and bottom
line represent quartiles. Index of policy support ¼ (
P
Desirable policies)  (
P
Feasible policies)
10 Listed consequences of poverty were: scarcity of skilled labor, violence and criminality, political pa-
tronage/populism, epidemics, international embarrassment, racial conflict, conflict among social
classes, lack of a solid domestic consumer market, decline in moral standards.
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conflict, criminality) in either the open- or closed-ended question. The result is a binary
measure in which ‘1’ represents the acknowledgment of externalities.
Ideology: Previous studies have pointed to the effect of ideologies about equality on the
attitudes of elites (Verba et al., 1987). We thus included a measure for ideology where we
asked respondents what they thought was more important: (0) liberty or (1) equality, as
asked in the World Values Survey.
Perception of responsibility: According to Reis and Moore (2005), perceptions of per-
sonal responsibility are a key factor in explaining elite attitudes toward redistribution. We
asked respondents to identify who they think is responsible for solving inequality, to which
we offered the option People like yourself.11 We added this covariate in the model as a bi-
nary measure in which ‘1’ indicates respondents agree that people like them are responsible
for solving inequality and ‘0’ indicates that they see others as responsible.
Willingness to pay more taxes: Several studies assume that elites oppose redistribution
because of the tax implications for themselves (e.g. Boix, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson,
2005). We asked elites whether they were willing to pay more taxes in order to implement
the policies that they identified as desirable and viable. The result is a binary variable where
‘1’ represents respondents’ willingness to pay more taxes.
Sex: Respondent sex is coded as 0¼male and 1¼ female. Although females are a minor-
ity among elites and within our samples, we control for sex in order to mitigate a potential
confounding effect.
Age: Age could have an effect on political preferences because it implies differences in po-
litical socialization. We coded age based on respondent’s year of birth.
Race: Given the salience of racial inequality in Brazil and South Africa, it is possible
that race could have a confounding effect on perceptions of the poor. We used respondents’
self-attributed racial identity, constructing a binary measure in which respondents who iden-
tified as ‘white’ were assigned ‘0’ and ‘1’ was assigned to those who identified as any other
racial category.
Socioeconomic background: Respondents’ own socioeconomic background may affect
their level of engagement with, and perceptions of, the poor. We used two variables
to capture socioeconomic background: mother’s education and father’s education. Here,
we re-scaled responses into an ordinal measure ranging from 1 to 6, where 6¼ college
degree or higher, 5¼ some college education, 4¼ high school diploma, 3¼ some high
school, 2¼ completed primary school and 1¼ less than primary school.
Table 3 presents the distribution of all referred measures by country.
3.4 Model specification
The model specification is as follows:
Y ¼ aþ b1PERCEPTION þ b2 SECþ b3EXT þ b4Xiþ l
Where Y¼ (
P
Desirable policies)  (
P
Feasible policies),12 a represents the intercept, b
represents average effects, PERCEPTION stands for respondents’ agreement with the idea
11 The other options were: NGOs, wealthy individuals, government, businessmen, organized civil soci-
ety, social movements.
12 For effects on each particular policy we ran logistic regressions. Results can be found in the
Supplementary Material.
12 M. Lo´pez et al.
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that average voters are uninformed and irrational, SEC represents membership of one of the
three elite sectors, EXT represents respondents’ perceptions of the negative externalities of
inequality, Xi represents all other control covariates and m represents the error term.
We conducted propensity score matching and permutation tests with the full data set
(which brings together data from all three countries) to provide an alternative estimation
of the size of the effect of perception of the poor as uninformed and irrational. Results can
be found in Appendix A. Before presenting results from the survey data, we first outline
the findings that emerged from the interviews and show how they inform our explanation
of the role of perceptions of the poor in shaping elites’ support for redistributive social
policies.
4. In-depth interview findings
Prior studies have highlighted the importance of elite perceptions of the negative externali-
ties of poverty and inequality in shaping their attitudes toward redistribution (de Swaan,
1988; Reis and Moore, 2005; Rueda and Stegmueller, 2016). In line with this literature, the
Brazilian elites who were interviewed perceived inequality to be a problem affecting not only
the poor but also themselves. When discussing the consequences of inequality, they most fre-
quently mentioned violence, crime and safety, although they also pointed to other issues,
such as the lack of a qualified workforce. Out of 56 participants, 49 described some kind of
Table 3. Distribution of variables
Brazil South Africa Uruguay
Variables Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
N policies desirable 7.90 1.73 3 10 7.45 1.70 2 10 7.70 1.39 4 10
N policies viable 7.68 1.79 1 10 4.92 2.17 0 10 7.59 1.16 3 10
Index of policy support 0.62 0.22 0.3 1 0.37 0.20 0 1 0.59 0.18 0.15 1
Externalities 0.68 0.46 0 1 0.84 0.36 0 1 0.64 0.48 0 1
Voters are uninformed
and irrational
0.77 0.47 0 1 0.59 1.93 0 1 0.33 0.47 0 1
People don’t know
how to vote
2.98 1.52 1 5 3.11 1.52 1 5 1.99 1.37 1 5
Freedom over equality 0.65 0.47 0 1 0.46 0.50 0 1 0.64 0.48 0 1
Willingness to pay taxes 0.60 0.49 0 1 0.49 0.50 0 1 0.70 0.45 0 1
Perception of
personal responsibility
0.11 0.31 0 1 0.28 0.45 0 1 0.10 0.28 0 1
Age 52.14 10.29 26 82 51.60 9.67 29 80 52.67 10.45 30 79
Race 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.63 0.48 0 1 0.03 0.18 0 1
Female 0.10 0.31 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.14 0.35 0 1
Father’s education
(on a 6-point scale)
3.78 2.17 1 6 3.57 1.69 1 6 3.86 1.61 1 6
Mother’s education
(on a 6-point scale)
3.43 1.94 1 6 3.19 1.53 1 6 3.74 1.63 1 6
Economic and cultural determinants of elite attitudes 13
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negative externality; the most commonly mentioned were violence and criminality, cited in
39 interviews.13
In 2013, for instance, a congressman lamented, ‘There is no fun in having money if you
are in a restaurant and there are people hitting the glass window asking for food outside.
You don’t enjoy your money as much as you could.’ He then quickly made the connection
between poverty and safety:
Not to mention public safety! What is the fun in living inside a bulletproof car, in a gated com-
munity? All those lights, security staff. . . I mean, this is no quality of life . . . What sense does it
make to be someone who can only feel safe when vacationing abroad?
Similar to this participant, others spoke explicitly of elite concerns about the effect of in-
equality on their own well-being. In 2013, a civil servant articulated this idea quite suc-
cinctly, ‘It is when the rich feel their safety threatened that they say: “Wait a minute, this is
affecting my personal safety.”’
Others contrasted their lives in Brazil to their experiences overseas, again highlighting
their concerns over safety. For instance, a business leader interviewed in 2012 stated:
Look, I have an apartment in New York. Over there, I walk on the street, I feel great, living with-
out worries in New York, but not in S~ao Paulo. I do not walk on the street in S~ao Paulo.
Literally, I walk on a treadmill! I don’t walk on a treadmill in New York, I walk on the street.
What does that imply in terms of wellbeing? I mean, the saddest thing is that there is no need for
that, [Brazil is] a country with an extraordinary economic potential.
Given the acknowledgment by Brazilian elites that inequality is a problem affecting not
only the poor but also themselves, it should come as no surprise that they have, overall, a
positive attitude toward redistribution. Nearly all participants argued that redistribution
policies are necessary. More importantly, they explained that less inequality would be in
their own interest, because it would allow them to enjoy their wealth and status. By improv-
ing the poor’s well-being, they argued, they would be improving their own.
In addition, Brazilian participants largely perceived poverty as structural and viewed the
poor as deserving of relief, expressing admiration for their hard work and pity for their
hardships—attitudes largely associated in the literature with support for redistribution (e.g.
Hochschild, 1981; Oorschot and Halman, 2000; Katz, 2013). For example, in 1999, an
elected official argued, ‘most of them [poor people] are honest, dignified people,’ while in
2013 a business leader argued that the poor were people who ‘just want to get ahead.’
Participants also proposed that differences in outcomes had to do with differences in op-
portunities, suggesting that they would support policies aimed at leveling the playing field.
In the words of an elected official in 1999, ‘There has never been a commitment to giving
the working class its fair share. The reason that these social classes are marginal is not that
they don’t want to work. They are marginalized because they are not given opportunities.’
Even though the poor were not perceived as undeserving of help, they were still morally
evaluated by the participants. Poor people were recurrently described as uninformed,
13 As discussed earlier, these frequencies were similar in both periods when interviews were con-
ducted. The exact frequency of all codes mentioned in this section are summarized in Table 1 in
the ‘Methods’ section.
14 M. Lo´pez et al.
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ignorant, uneducated and even irrational. These types of descriptions appeared spontane-
ously in 39 of the 56 interviews and were highly salient across elite groups and in both time
periods. Such perceptions prompted the elites to question the poor’s ability to act in their
own self-interest. For example, in 1999, an elected official explained, ‘Improvements will
never come from the excluded masses.’ Conceptualizing the poor as incapable of reason, he
argued that little can be expected of them. ‘As I said, we cannot expect anything from them.
We cannot expect anything from a person who is not capable of reason, at the most basic
level, of [making sense of] what is going on in the world.’
Similarly, in 2013 a business leader invoked an inextricable relationship between poverty
and knowledge:
The main consequence of poverty is the lack of knowledge. The lack of knowledge. And then
health problems, malnutrition, all the educational problems. We don’t have the basic conditions
for people to have a minimum amount of knowledge, basic notions so that they can have a better
life.
Participants described the poor as victims of poverty who are—most of the time, irrevers-
ibly—unable to act in their own material interests. They viewed the structural constraints of
poverty as imposing strong limitations on rationality. In other words, while the poor were
not seen as directly responsible for their own poverty, poverty itself was seen to structure ir-
rational behavior. In 1999, a business leader concisely illustrated this view, ‘Extreme pov-
erty makes one not see anything. It is a black veil over people’s heads. It blinds them.’
In the narratives of participants, the perception of the poor as being uneducated, unwise
and incapable of rational decision-making were seen to be particularly consequential for po-
litical behavior. Ignorant, poor voters were viewed as a threat due to their susceptibility to
manipulation by other elites—a risk explicitly cited in two-thirds of the interviews. Political
elites, in particular, were accused of subverting desirable redistributive policies in order to
satisfy their immediate clientelist needs, while voters stood by passively. Contrary to their
views of the poor, elites saw politicians as rational and selfish maximizers.
The relationship between ignorance and political manipulation was invoked in the 1999
and 2013 interviews. In 1999, one business leader distinguished between the poor and the
‘thinking and property-holding classes,’ who—in his view—are ‘not ashamed to keep in
place this unjust system.’ Another business leader claimed, ‘The government wastes money
in all it does,’ because policies end up serving the ‘individual gains’ of other elites. A business
leader in 2013 similarly expressed that there was ‘obviously a political agenda’ behind cash
transfer policies, which were a project to ‘garner votes [in order] to remain in power.’
The understanding of poor people as ignorant and irrational led some of the participants
to blame the poor for their poverty—not due to their lack of deservingness or laziness but
because of their political behavior. A businessperson interviewed in 2013 illustrates this rea-
soning, ‘The unpreparedness of the population during the electoral process is so serious. . . it
is a process of vote buying, a process of using policies for marketing, and this way the pros-
pect of actual change becomes very limited.’
Politicians and civil servants—accused by business elites of biasing policies to benefit
themselves—expressed similar sentiments. When asked about the unintended consequences
of social policies, one civil servant, in 2013, said that he viewed ‘it all with great suspicion,’
implying that social policies could be used by political elites to channel benefits to loyalists.
Economic and cultural determinants of elite attitudes 15
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As put by a civil servant in 1999, ‘The public officials have the ability to do things right for
their community . . . but sometimes they [public officials] entertain other possibilities because
of their clientelist political character.’ When discussing his own policy agenda, an elected of-
ficial in 1999 similarly argued that politicians were ‘used to making politics out of the basic
needs of the population’.
In sum, the narratives we found in these interviews with Brazilian elites show that they
were aware of the negative effects of inequality, not only for the poor but also for them-
selves. They expressed an overall positive attitude toward redistribution, which they per-
ceived as fair and desirable, and agreed that the poor were deserving of help. Nevertheless,
they remained skeptical of the odds of success of social policies due to the perceived igno-
rance of the poor. This perceived irrationality was particularly salient when it came to politi-
cal behavior. The poor were seen by participants as easily manipulated by politicians and
civil servants who could use social policies as clientelist tools; as a result, participants
remained skeptical regarding the likelihood of success of such policies. The persistence of
these perceptions over time is striking. In the period between 1999 and 2013, Brazil shifted
from a center-right to a center-left government coalition and from economic crisis to re-
source abundance. Yet the way in which elites spoke about poor voters showed little
change.
These narratives point to the importance of distinctions made against the poor in shaping
attitudes towards redistributive policies. The elites in these interviews found themselves in a
double bind: poverty was a problem, and the poor deserved to be helped, but poverty could
not be tackled effectively because of the poor’s lack of political sophistication and strategic
reasoning. Our findings suggest that perceptions of the poor as ignorant reduce support for
redistributive policies. To test this hypothesis, we turn to the survey data.
5. Survey results
In what follows, we test the effect of elite perceptions of the poor on their willingness to sup-
port redistributive policies. We begin with the Brazilian case and then replicate the analysis
in the two other cases: South Africa and Uruguay.
5.1 Brazil
In Brazil, survey data revealed similar patterns to those found in the interview data. Figure 2
presents the distribution of responses for three key variables in both samples in Brazil,
highlighting the convergence between them. When asked about the main consequences of
poverty and inequality, over 60% of the elites surveyed, and an equal proportion of inter-
view participants pointed to violence or conflict. When asked whether they believed that re-
distribution was necessary, 95% of respondents answered in the affirmative. This was
similar to findings from the interviews, where 86% of respondents spoke generally about re-
distribution as being necessary. Finally, as did the Brazilian elites who participated in the in-
depth interviews, most who took part in the closed-ended survey characterized the poor as
ignorant and irrational. When asked about ‘average voters’ (our proxy for elites’ perceptions
of the poor as political actors), 77% of respondents described them as ignorant and irratio-
nal. This was virtually the same proportion of spontaneous mentions of ignorance in the
interviews. If our hypothesis holds, then the presence of this perception should result in a
16 M. Lo´pez et al.
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reduction in the willingness of elites to support redistributive social policies, regardless of
their perspective of the negative externalities of poverty and inequality.
As discussed in the methods section, we constructed an index to measure elite support
for redistributive policies. This allowed us to capture not just an abstract sentiment of global
support for redistribution, but a more specific assessment of the views of elites on both the
desirability and feasibility of a range of redistributive policies. Table 4 presents the estimated
effect of perceptions of the poor. Results show that elite views of the poor as uninformed
and irrational reduces their support for redistributive policies. On average, this reduction is
between 0.11 and 0.27 points in the index of policy support (where 1 indicates full support).
The effect is robust to the inclusion of several covariates, including ideology and tax
avoidance.
The impact of perceptions of externalities on elite support for redistributive social poli-
cies is, as we predicted, positive, but the effect is rather weak and thus disappointing within
the context of the larger story presented here, which follows the political economy literature.
Based on confidence intervals and P-values, we cannot dismiss the possibility of a null effect
of externalities in the population. On the other hand, it is possible that our binary measure
of perceived externalities is generating a ceiling effect because it does not allow respondents
to grade their concern, or indicate how much they view themselves to be affected by such ex-
ternalities. For our purposes, what is important is that the negative effect of perceiving the
poor as irrational nullifies any potential positive effect of externalities. It should also be
noted that the two variables are not themselves correlated,14 which indicates that the effect
of perceptions of the poor is independent from that of perceptions of externalities.
Results also show that political elites tend to be more supportive of redistributive meas-
ures than other elites in the sample. This is expected given politicians’ electoral connections
Figure 2. Convergence between interview findings and survey results (% response).
14 See correlation matrix in the Supplementary Material.
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with poor voters. Still, the effect of perceptions of the poor remains strong even when
controlling for elite groups, suggesting that average effects are not induced by partisanship
or other electoral incentives. Overall, the regression models support the hypothesis that
emerged from the interviews.
5.2 South Africa
In South Africa, almost 60% of respondents described the average voter as irrational and
uninformed, a similar rate to that found in the Brazilian sample. Table 5 presents the results
of OLS regressions run on the South African data. As predicted, the results are very similar
to those found in Brazil, with a robust negative effect of perceptions of the poor as unin-
formed and irrational on elite support for redistributive policies.
As in Brazil, results in South Africa are robust to the inclusion of several covariates.
The South African findings support the hypothesis that perceptions of the poor as ignorant,
uninformed and irrational results in reduced support for redistributive policies. Again,
differences between elite groups are most notable in politicians’ higher levels of support for
redistributive policies.
5.3 Uruguay
In Uruguay, only 33% of respondents described the average voter as irrational. Among poli-
ticians and civil servants, this was less than 15%. Among business elites, however, around
70% characterized the poor as irrational. This suggests that differences between elite sectors
are even more relevant in Uruguay than in the other two cases. Table 6 presents results for
Table 4. Effect of perceptions of the poor on elite support for redistribution in Brazil
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Poor are irrational 0.191*** 0.035 0.192*** 0.035 0.129*** 0.034 0.134*** 0.036
Externalities .018 0.037 0.002 0.033 0.014 0.034
Business elite 0.152*** 0.037 0.140*** 0.042
Political elite 0.076* 0.040 0.081* 0.044
Female 0.108 0.079
Father education 0.001 0.012
Mother education 0.003 0.014
Race 0.055 0.042
Age 0.002 0.002
Ideology 0.053 0.036
Perception of
self as responsible
0.051 0.048
Willingness to
pay more taxes
0.052^ 0.032
Intercept 0.741*** 0.028 0.729*** 0.038 0.732*** 0.043 0.872*** 0.117
R2 0.130 0.170 0.341 0.419
N 147 147 147 135
Pˆ < 0.11; *P < 0.10; **P < 0.05; ***P < 0.01.
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Table 5. Effect of perceptions of the poor on elite support for redistribution in South Africa
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Poor are irrational 0.152*** 0.034 0.151*** 0.034 0.131*** 0.036 0.100*** 0.036
Externalities 0.017 0.047 0.008 0.046 0.016 0.045
Business elite 0.057 00.039 0.084* 0.041
Political elite 0.138*** .040 0.129** 0.046
Female 0.041 0.061
Father education 0.042*** 0.015
Mother education 0.051*** 0.016
Race 0.073* 0.043
Age 0.000 0.002
Ideology 0.014 0.035
Perception of
self as responsible
0.033 0.036
Willingness to
pay more taxes
0.075* 0.033
Intercept 0.469*** 0.027 0.483*** 0.047 0.400*** 0.051 0.320** 0.136
R2 0.125 0.126 0.196 0.357
N 142 142 142 132
*P < 0.10; **P < 0.05; ***P < 0.01.
Table 6. Effect of perceptions of the poor on elite support for redistribution in Uruguay
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Poor are irrational 0.117*** 0.029 0.120*** 0.029 0.057^ 0.034 0.033 0.037
Externalities 0.028 0.030 0.037 0.029 0.019 0.034
Business elite 0.105** 0.038 0.096** 0.045
Political elite 0.015 0.034 0.001 0.040
Female 0.040 0.044
Father education 0.014 0.012
Mother education 0.018 0.012
Race 0.146 0.122
Age 0.002 0.001
Ideology 0.015 0.031
Perception of
self as responsible
0.035 0.048
Willingness to
pay more taxes
0.064* 0.037
Intercept 0.633*** 0.017 0.615*** 0.026 0.620*** 0.032 0.716*** 0.113
R2 0.097 0.103 0.165 0.237
N 151 151 151 126
Pˆ < 0.11; *P < 0.10; **P < 0.05; ***P < 0.01.
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the Uruguayan data. Estimations are limited, however, by the very strong correlation be-
tween belonging to the business sector and perceiving the average voter as irrational.
Nevertheless, as in Brazil and South Africa, here too we see that elite perceptions of the aver-
age voter as irrational result in a reduction in policy support.
6. Discussion and conclusions
Our findings show that elites’ acknowledgment of the negative externalities of inequality
could indeed foster positive attitudes toward redistribution, but also that the way they see
the poor impacts upon their support for redistributive social policies. Results suggest that
elites’ limited support for redistribution is not the result of a belief that poverty and inequal-
ity pose minimal threats (Haggard and Kaufman, 2012, 2016; Ansell and Samuels, 2014) or
that existing institutions shield them from such threats (Albertus and Menaldo, 2014). Even
if elites rely on predatory state practices, low-paid labor and other institutions that generate
vicious cycles of impoverishment and inequality, our results show that elites worry about
the consequences of such inequality for their own safety and well-being, as indeed predicted
by existing literature (see de Swaan, 1988; Reis and Moore, 2005; Rueda and Stegmueller,
2016). All things considered, elites envision a scenario in which some redistribution would
solve many of their problems at a reasonable cost—a cost that they claim to be willing to
pay if they have some assurance that such policies will work.
This belief, however, does not automatically translate into more support for redistribu-
tive policies. Instead, elite views of the poor curtail any such commitment. Our findings
point to the role of elite perceptions of the poor in hindering their willingness to pursue such
policy goals. Their views of the poor as ignorant, irrational and susceptible to manipulation
by other elites ultimately lead them to reject social policies that they would otherwise find in
their own interest. Our interpretation of results is as follows: because elites view the poor as
ignorant and irrational, they do not trust them to make informed decisions and instead view
them as susceptible to manipulation by other, utility-maximizing, elites. Elite perceptions of
the poor, in other words, disrupt the effect of their acknowledgment of the negative external-
ities of inequality on their commitment to redistributive social policies. In documenting these
trends, we have argued that cultural variables—in the form of perceptions of others—are
crucial to explaining why redistributive policies have garnered only limited elite support.
The theoretical contribution of our study, therefore, is to highlight how culture mediates the
effect of material interests on policy preferences.
Is it possible, however, that our data reflect nothing but the discursive justification of a
crude rational calculus? Although we do not necessarily take everything said in the inter-
views at face value, we do not believe that the participants were deliberately deceiving them-
selves or the interviewers. Why would elites not prefer a scenario in which they could still
hold power and wealth but not suffer the negative externalities of poverty? After all, politi-
cal and economic elites have the tools to allow some redistribution while allocating costs
elsewhere (e.g. to the middle class). Our findings suggest that perceptions of the poor play a
key role in explaining why elites do not see such solutions as viable.
We also do not think that the survey data on policy support reflect respondents’ justifica-
tions of their pre-existing policy preferences. Our outcome variable is composed of the inter-
action between two series of questions. It would be highly unlikely that respondents could
anticipate their score. Nevertheless, one might argue that elite perceptions of the poor are
20 M. Lo´pez et al.
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caused by their observation of the tendency for redistributive policies to fail. Such a causal
relationship is indeed possible but not incompatible with our argument. It suggests that past
experiences of failed redistribution may lead elites to construct explanations that blame the
poor, thus hindering future support for redistributive policies.
Although our main findings point to perceptions of the poor as a key predictor of sup-
port for redistributive policies at the individual level, our results also suggest important
cross-national differences in the prevalence of such perceptions across cases, with Brazilian
and South African elites describing the average voter as ignorant and irrational much more
frequently than their Uruguayan counterparts. Blofield (2011a) argues that overall levels of
inequality foster a degree of social distance between elites and average citizens. This may ex-
plain the baseline differences we observe in negative perceptions of the poor between our
cases. In Brazil and South Africa, our two cases with extreme and enduring inequalities,
elites were much more likely to describe the poor as ignorant and uninformed than they
were in Uruguay, with its less marked history of inequality. While our data are limited in
their ability to unpack how perceptions develop and take hold, the cross-national differences
in our study point to important avenues for future research that account for the role played
by historical and contemporary social and economic cleavages between elites and the poor.
At the same time, country-level variables cannot be assumed to be the sole, or even the
main, explanation for aggregated levels of elite distrust toward the poor. Business elites in
the three cases show similar extreme views of the poor and concomitant lower support for
redistributive policies. This is particularly striking in the case of Uruguay, where business
elites display patterns much more similar to their Brazilian and South African counterparts
than to local political and civil servant elites. This pattern suggests that elite sectors likely
mediate any relationship between macrosocial factors and elites’ individual attitudes. It fur-
ther points to the importance of considering variation in elites’ economic capital as well as
their social distance from and dependence on voters in shaping their perceptions of the poor.
Finally, it is important to consider the role that racial boundaries might play across our
cases. In Brazil and South Africa, ‘average voters’ are likely to be perceived as black or brown,
whereas in Uruguay they are likely to be perceived as white. This racialized understanding of
poverty may factor into elites’ views of the poor. Although we cannot get at this type of associ-
ation between race and poverty in our survey data, we might have expected it to emerge as sig-
nificant in the in-depth interviews conducted with Brazilian elites. It did not. This of course
does not mean that such images and boundaries do not exist. It means that they were not mo-
bilized by participants during interviews—a silence that plausibly reflects a type of self-
censorship built into a history of color-blind racism in Brazil (Moraes Silva, 2016).
Despite these cross-national differences, our findings about the processes that connect
economic incentives, culture and attitudes toward redistribution hold in the three cases and
are likely generalizable to other developing democracies. The comparative trends offer im-
portant avenues for future research. In addition to the effects of overall levels of inequality,
researchers may wish to examine the role of other macro-level variables in explaining micro-
level perceptions and preferences. These might include the legacies of authoritarian rule, the
type of welfare regime and—as discussed above—the salience of racial boundaries, to name
but a few. Such research would continue to advance our knowledge of both the cultural and
economic determinants of redistribution.
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Supplementary material is available at Socio-Economic Review Journal online.
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Appendix A
A.1 Results with non-parametric methods
As an alternative estimation of the average magnitude of the effect of perceptions, we used
propensity score matching and permutation tests in which we ran 1,000 linear models in
subsamples of 100 randomly selected observations. Results show effect sizes that are similar
to those observed in the previous linear models.
Table A1.Matching results with the full sample
Result 1 Result 2
Coef SE Coef SE
Poor are irrational 0.195*** 0.023 0.120*** 0.025
Intercept 0.598*** 0.025 0.633*** 0.023
Elite sector fixed effect No Yes
Country fixed effect No Yes
R2 0.178 0.380
N 340 340
Notes: Observations matched on propensity score, using ‘nearest’ method. Covariates included are: race, age, fe-
male, father education, mother education, elite sector, externalities, ideology, willingness to pay taxes and coun-
try. Balance was achieved in all covariates, except elite sector and country, which are accounted for in Result 2.
*P < 0.10; **P < 0.05; ***P < 0.01.
Table A2. Permutation test with the full sample
Permutation 1 Permutation 2
Estimate SE Estimate SE
Poor are irrational 0.164*** 0.045 0.110*** 0.021
Externalities 0.024 0.020
Intercept 0.619*** 0.032 0.719*** 0.072
Elite sector fixed effect No Yes
Country fixed effect No Yes
Controls No Yes
Note: 1000 samples of n¼ 100 with no replacement.
*P < 0.10; **P < 0.05; ***P < 0.01.
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